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E
arlier this year, several bills were intro-
duced in Congress to curb what many
consumer advocates have described as
abusive credit card practices. These bills were
intended to keep credit card issuers from penal-
izing consumers for paying their card balances
in full each month. In unveiling one of the
measures,CongressmanJohnLaFalcedeclared,
[Consumers] should not be tricked or trapped
into escalating interest rates and unnecessary
fees. And they clearly deserve better than to be
punished for paying off debt and for responsibly
using their credit cards.
Apparently, many consumers agree. According
to a November 1996 survey by Money magazine,
79percentofrespondentssupportedlegislationto
restrict how credit card issuers set fees and
account terms.
With such strong consumer support for credit
card reform, it is not surprising that Congress
responded. In fact, Congress has repeatedly
considered similar measures, some even more
restrictive, such as proposals to cap the interest
ratechargedoncreditcardaccounts.Thesemea-
sureshaveincommononepotentiallydisturbing
feature: if passed into law, they each would
impose price controls on credit card accounts.
This article addresses whether such legislative
efforts can achieve the stated objective of bene-
fiting consumers. Section I reviews many past
and pending efforts to reform credit card pricing.
The effects of such price controls depend on the
many price terms and product features that
determine a credit cards true cost to consumers,
and on industry characteristics that determine
how card issuers set account terms. Conse-
quently, section II describes the price of a credit
card, while section III considers the structure of
the card industry and its implications for issuers
pricing practices. Sections IV and V analyze the
economic effects of setting a ceiling on one or
more components of price. The conclusion is
that consumers as a whole generally do not ben-
efit from reform measures of the type studied.
The effective price of a credit card account
might not fall for manyor anyconsumers as
a result of a pricing restriction, and credit avail-
ability is likely to be reduced, at least to some
consumers. Supporting evidence from the U.S.
economys most recent experience with binding
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CREDIT CARD REFORM




record levels as well. State usury ceilings in place
at the time capped the interest rate that could be
charged on consumer loans. With market interest
rates bumping against ceilings in many states,
credit card lending became unprofitable. Many
states passed emergency legislation to raise the
ceilings on interest rates. And the Federal Reserve
Board established a national requirement of 30-
daysadvance notice for all changes to the terms
of credit card accounts. This requirement super-
seded the multitude of state regulations regarding
cardholder notification, and thus allowed card
terms to be changed more quickly and more
frequently. Cardissuers responded, raising inter-
est rates and adjusting other account terms. (Sec-
tion VI reviews the 1980 experience in more
detail.)
By 1985, market interest rates had fallen dra-
matically, while credit card rates remained high.
The national average for credit card interest rates
was reportedly 18.62 percent, while the prime
rate was down to 9.5 percent and the discount
ratethe rate at which the Federal Reserve lends
to bankswas at 7.5 percent. The wide gap in
rates caught the attention of consumer groups
and policymakers, initiating the first round of
many efforts to reform card pricing (U.S. House
1985).
Reform efforts have fallen into two categories:
those aimed at forcing issuers to disclose more
fully and clearly the terms of the charge accounts
they offer and those aimed at restricting issuers
abilitytosetaccountprices.Manyofthepropos-
als to restrict pricing also incorporate measures
to improve disclosure. While the benefits of dis-
closure measures are themselves debatable, this
article addresses only pricing restrictions.
Early reform efforts
In 1985, legislators introduced several bills
intoCongressthataimedtocapcreditcardinter-
est rates. (Table 1 summarizes these and other
selectedlegislativeefforts.)Eachbillsetamaxi-
mumlevelfortheannualpercentageinterestrate
(APR) that could be charged on a credit card
account. The caps were flexible in that they tied
the maximum APR to some market interest rate,
rather than fixing it at a specific level. Two bills
were introduced in the House of Representa-
tives. One limited the APR to five percentage
points above the 90-day commercial paper rate.
The other restricted the APR to six percentage
points above the 3-month Treasury bill rate
unless a study of competition in the card indus-
try found existing rates to reflect the cost of
funds and degree of competition for new card
accounts. Bills tying the APR to yet other mar-
ket rates were introduced into the Senate. Sub-
committees held hearings on all measures, but
that is where congressional action ended.
Almost as soon as the 1985 bills had been dis-
missed, others took their place. Like the 1985
bills,theseallrestrictedtheamountbywhichthe
maximumAPRcouldexceedsomebaseinterest
rate. One of the measures ultimately became an
amendment to other legislation but was voted
down 56 to 356 in the full House.
After that, the movement to cap credit card
rates waned. The most likely reason was a gradual
decline in card rates brought about by increased
competitioninthecreditcardmarket.Forinstance,
a week before the hearings on the 1987 bills,
American Express introduced its Optima card,
which carried a 13.5 percent APR compared to
the market average APR of about 18 percent.
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Table 1
SELECTED EFFORTS IN THE MOVEMENT FOR CREDIT CARD
PRICING REFORM
Legislation Purpose
1985: Credit Card Interest Rate Limitation Act
Resurrected in
1986: Credit Card Account Holder Protection Act
1987: Credit Card Interest Rate Limitation Act
Variations introduced in
1985: A bill to amend the Truth in Lending Act
National Credit Card Consumer Protection
Act
Credit Cardholder Protection Act
(resurrected in 1987 and again in 1991)
1987: Credit Card Fairness Act
Credit Card Account Holder Protection Act
Competitive Credit Card Interest Rate Act
1994: Credit Card Interest Rate Cap Act
To cap the maximum APR on credit card accounts at six
percentage points above the 3-month Treasury bill rate.
Would set the cap at five percentage points above the 90-day
commercial paper rate.
Would set the cap at five percentage points above the
6-month Treasury bill rate.
Would set the cap at four percentage points above the inter-
est rate charged by the IRS for delinquent tax payments.
Would set the cap at five percentage points above the Fed-
eral Reserves discount rate.
Would set the cap at six percentage points above the Federal
Reserves discount rate.
Would set the cap at eight percentage points above the
1-year Treasury bill rate, but not to supersede any lower
state limits.
Would set the cap at nine percentage points above the
6-month Treasury bill rate.
1991:Credit and Charge Card Disclosure and
Interest Rate Amendments Act (passed in
the Senate)
Allows President, after a study of the card industrys com-
petitiveness, to set a rate cap at ten percentage points above
the 6-month Treasury bill rate.
1997: Credit Card Consumer Protection Act
Resurrected in:
1999: Credit Card Consumer Protection Act (pending)
Variations introduced in:
1998: Amendment to the Consumer Bankruptcy
Reform Act (passed in the House)
Credit Card On-Time Payment Protection Plan
1999: Consumer Credit Card Protection
Amendments (pending)
To prevent card issuers from imposing fees for on-time pay-
ment of credit card bills.
Would also prevent canceling an account because of on-time
payment.
Source: AuthorscompilationfromU.S.congressionalrecords. Unlessotherwiseindicated,neithertheHousenortheSenate
passed the legislation.Mission accomplishedalmost
Efforts to cap credit card rates resurfaced unex-
pectedly in 1991. During a fundraising event in
November, President George Bush deviated from
his prepared statement to remark, Id frankly
like to see the credit card rates down. I believe
that would help stimulate the consumer and get
consumer confidence moving again. Congress
sprung to action. The next day a bill was introduced
in the Senate to cap credit card interest rates at
four percentage points above the rate the IRS
charged for underpayment of taxes. This would
have put the maximum allowable APR below the
prevailing average rate by approximately five per-
centage points. Even more surprising, the bill
passedinthefullSenatethesamedayafteronly
30 minutes of discussion, and by a vote of 74-19.
The House followed the Senates lead, introduc-
ing equivalent legislation the next day.
Bushs advisers and cabinet members joined
industry experts in opposing the rate cap. Trea-
sury Secretary Nicholas Brady called it wacky,
senseless legislation. The Nilson Report, a card-
industry newsletter, said that with a 14 percent
cap, banks would lose $9.73 per card if they
kept their current customers. The president of
MasterCard International put the potential loss at
$3.10per$100ofcardloans,whichhesaidwould
make credit card lending uneconomical.
Aweeklater,whentheHousedebatedthelegis-
lation,allsignsseemedtopointtoitspassage.But
when the stocks of banks with large credit card
portfolios plummeted, reportedly in response to
the expected vote in favor of the measure, Con-
gress immediately dropped the matter. This is the
closest federal rate-cap legislation has gotten to
passage (Bacon and Wessel; Bary; Moletsky;
Pae; and Quint). Only once since then, in 1994,
has Congress introduced similar rate-cap legisla-
tion, and that bill died in subcommittee.
From rate caps to fee caps
More recently, legislative efforts to restrict
card pricing practices have focused on the fees
imposed on card users rather than on the interest
rate charged. These efforts were motivated by
GE Capital Corp.s September 1996 announce-
ment that it would impose a $25 annual fee on
holders of GE Rewards credit cards who regu-
larly pay their balances in full. A spokesperson
for GE Capital described the fee as modest and
designed to offset operating and administrative
costs associated with our rewards program. GE
would waive the fee if a cardholder paid at least
$25 in interest charges annually. Ruth Susswein,
president of Bankcard Holders of America, cal-
culatedthatGEwasmakingaprofitof$318ona
customer who carried an outstanding balance,
but was losing $30 on those who repaid in full
each month (Coulton).
One legislator, concerned about the impact on
consumers of what had become known as the
GE fee, took action. In 1997, Representative
Joseph Kennedy introduced a bill to prohibit the
fee (in other words, to cap the fee at $0). The bill
also would have prohibited retroactive interest
onchargesnotpaidduringthegraceperiodthe
period from the statement date to the date by
which payment must be received to avoid inter-
est charges. It also would have frozen rates and
fees on canceled-card balances.
The threat of legislation was enough to induce
most issuers to cancel plans to impose GE fees.
Issuers instead took other steps to cover the cost
of serving customers who repaid their bills in
full.InonecasereportedshortlyafterKennedys
bill was introduced, a bank that issued credit
cards for a wholesale club canceled the accounts
of 42,000 club members who incurred little in
interest fees. When the wholesale club sued, the
bank agreed to reopen the accounts of card-
holders who would pay a $30 annual usage fee
(Arditi).
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Senate passed an amendment to a pending bank-
ruptcy reform bill. The amendment would pro-
hibit the imposition of fees or penalties or the
cancellation of cards solely because cardholders
pay their bills in full. Before years end, the
House agreed to a version of the bankruptcy bill
containing the provisions in the Senates amend-
ment, but the Senate did not. Meanwhile, Con-
gressman John LaFalce introduced into the
House a bill similar to the Senates amendment.
That bill was introduced too late in the 105
th Con-
gress to be addressed, so LaFalce reintroduced it
inearly1999asH.R.900.Thebillwouldprohibit
the imposition of higher fees or interest rates,
other penalties, and the cancellation of card
accounts, for cardholders who pay their balances
in full. Other bills, closer to Kennedys in that
theywouldnotprohibitthecancelingofcardsdue
to on-time payment, emerged in both the House
and Senate about the same time.
Theselatestbills,liketherate-capbillsthatpre-
ceded them, are simply efforts to impose price
controlslegal restrictions on what prices card
issuers can set for their products. The effects of
such restrictions depend on how credit card bor-
rowing is priced. The price consumers really pay
for a card depends, in turn, on the many price and
nonprice terms of a card account and on industry
factors that determine how issuers set account
terms. The next section describes the former,
whilethesubsequentsectiondiscussesthelatter.
II. THE PRICE OF CHARGING IT
Credit cards are an extremely complex product,
servingmanydifferentroles.Acreditcardgivesa
consumer access to a source of credit and thus
serves both as a way of borrowing against future
income to make purchases today and as a source
of funds for an emergency. It also provides a
meansofmakingtransactionsand,inmanycases,
a source of services such as discounted travel via
accumulated frequent-flyer miles or rental-car
insurance. Because of the variety of services a
credit card offers, the effective price for the con-
sumer (the true cost) of a card depends not on a
singleprice,butratheronanarrayofpriceterms
and product features. This section describes the
manycomponentsofacardseffectivepriceand
the link between those components and issuers
profits.
The effective price of a credit card
To understand the factors determining the effec-
tive price of a credit card, it is useful to consider
the pricing of freshly brewed coffee at an espresso
bar. The retailer typically charges a posted price
for, say, a small or large coffee. This is the major
component of the price of a cup of coffee. But
frequent-buyer discountssuch as one cup free
for each ten cups purchasedare commonplace
at such establishments. A retailer can directly
change the effective price of a cup of coffee
either by changing the posted price or by changing
the frequent-buyer component of price. In addi-
tion, the retailer can indirectly affect the cost to
customers by altering the size of the cups used.
Thiswouldchangetheeffectivepriceperounce.
Finally,nonpriceaspectsofthecupofcoffeecan
be altered to affect the coffees value from the
customers perspective. If a higher quality bean is
used, or the roasting process improved, or the
wait in line shortened, then the cup of coffee
becomes a better value for the customer, which
means the customers effective price is lower.
Likewise, the effective price of using a credit
card is determined by the cards various price
and nonprice components. The major compo-
nent is associated with the fundamental service
thecardoffersaccesstoalineofcredit.Unlike
automobile loans and home mortgages, which
are secured by the asset being purchased with
the loan, the vast majority of credit card borrow-
ing is unsecured. Card borrowing is also very
flexible in that the customer is free to choose
when and how much to borrow (at least within
the credit limit), as well as the repayment sched-
ule. The dollar volume of card purchases that a
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nextbillingcycle,istreatedasacardloan,andthe
price per dollar borrowed is the interest rate (that
is, the APR). The customer incurs a monthly
finance charge, which is determined according to
a formula set by the card issuer for applying the
APR to the revolving balance. Some issuers
charge a higher APR for revolving balances that
originate from instant cash loans, called cash
advances, than they do for balances incurred
through purchases. A 1998 survey of bank card
issuers by the American Bankers Association
(ABA), summarized in Table 2, found evidence
of a variety of card product offerings and price
components.
Though the average APR for revolving credit
cardloanshasbeenabove10percentfordecades,
most issuers still charge no interest for the very
short-termborrowingdonewhencardholderspay
theirbillsinfullwithinthegraceperiod.Ineffect,
cardholders can borrow funds interest free from
the time a purchase is made until the end of the
grace period. In fact, according to the ABA,
between35and43percentofcardholdersin1998
didnotrevolvebalancesorincurinterestcharges.
The non-APR components of a cards price
include an assortment of fees. There are annual
fees, along with penalty fees triggered by actions
such as late payment or charging beyond the
credit limit. Some accounts are even subject to
up-front fees for cash advances (in addition to the
APR on cash advances) or for use of the card to
pay taxes.
The effective price of a credit card also is
affected by the cards nonprice features, which
include the number and quality of services that
cardholders can access with their cards. Today,
many cards offer customers frequent-flyer miles,
extendedwarrantiesforgoodspurchasedwiththe
card, various forms of travel insurance, travel and
emergency assistance, and credit insurance. Stan-
dard(orclassic),gold,andplatinumcardsaredis-
tinguished in part by the services offered. On
some accounts, most of the extra services are
available free of charge. Like improvements to
the roasting process for coffee in an espresso
bar, the provision of additional or enhanced ser-
vices improves the quality of a credit card,
thereby lowering the effective price of the card
to consumers.
Making money from cards
Card issuers are in business to make money,
and the effective price they charge in large part
determines their profits. Interest income depends
on the APR, the length of the grace period, the
method of calculating the finance charge, and
default rates. According to the ABA survey,
interest accounts for at least 65 percent of reve-
nuefortheaverageissuer.Thisrevenueisgener-
ated by customers who revolve balances.
Annual fees and other fees imposed on card-
holdersaccountatleastforanother11percentof
revenue. For a majority of issuers, other fees
contribute more to revenue than annual fees.
Nonprice aspects of credit cards, such as the
qualityofcustomerserviceofferedandthepro-
vision of rental-car insurance, affect issuers
profits through both revenue and cost. Issuers
can attract and retain more customers and earn
more revenue by improving quality, but they
also incur higher costs from doing so.
The credit card industry is unusual, however,
in that there are third parties from whom issuers
canearnrevenue.Infact,thebulkoftheremainder
ofissuersrevenuescomesfromfeesimposedon
merchants who accept their cards. These fees,
known as interchange fees, are a percentage of
total card purchases. The major card associations
(Visa, MasterCard, etc.) set interchange-fee
rates, so issuers choice of card association
determines their interchange rate. According to
the ABA survey, interchange fees account for
as muchas20percentofissuersrevenues,mak-
ing them the major source of revenue from
cardholderswhodonotholdrevolvingbalances.
For the purposes of this article, interchange fees
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Table 2
BANK CARD ISSUERS PRICING, MARKETING, AND PERFORMANCE









Accounts with revolving balances 65.0% 65.0% 57.0%













Banks segmenting market (% of banks) 8.1% 41.7% 62.5%









Total cost per active account $157.47 $65.69 $44.51
Top three factors in setting interest rate
on standard/classic cards (ranked)
1. Competition
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3. Competition
Banks offering standard/classic cards with
three or more different APRs (% of banks) 18.7% 58.5% 80.0%













Banks charging annual fees on
standard/classic cards (% of banks) 50.0% 71.4% 85.7%





















Source: American Bankers Association, 1998 Bank Card Industry Survey Report, 7th ed.,Washington, 1998. Results are
based on a nationwide survey of the 250 largest card issuers and a random sample of smaller bank card issuers. Small issuers
arethosewithlessthan$50millionincardoutstandingsorlessthan50,000cardaccountswithbalances.Midsizeissuersare
those with $50 to $749 million in card outstandings or 50,000 to 749,999 card accounts with balances. Large issuers are
those with at least $750 million in card outstandings or at least 750,000 card accounts.
(% of banks):
(% of total revenue):are relevant mainly because of the greater flexi-
bility they provide issuers in setting the effective
price to consumers.
III. A LOOK INSIDE THE CREDIT
CARD INDUSTRY
In the absence of regulation, the structure of the
creditcardindustrydeterminestheeffectiveprice
of a card and issuers flexibility in adjusting the
components of effective price. This section dis-
cusses the link between industry structure and
credit card pricing. Three conclusions emerge.
First, although some structural characteristics of
the industry tend to induce very competitive pric-
ing,othersmightgivesomeissuerslimitedpower
topricenoncompetitively.Second,differingchar-
acteristics, supply costs, and revenue potential
across consumers make it possibleand even
attractivefor issuers to segment the market into
distinct consumer groups by offering cards with
different price and nonprice features. Third, these
features of the card industry are critical determi-
nants of the impact pricing restrictions have on
consumers.
Competitiveness and market power
The credit card industry has two features usually
associated with competitive industriesa large
number of firms and an absence of barriers to
entry. In fact, today thousands of issuers populate
the industry, and new entry continues. Technically,
only a banking institution can issue cards, but this
does not keep nonbanks from competing. Non-
bank issuers can enter by opening a credit card
bank themselves or by forming contractual rela-
tionships with existing bank card issuers. Among
recent successful nonbank entrants are Sears,
which began issuing the Discover Card in 1986,
and AT&T, which entered the market with the
UniversalCardin1990.Thiseaseofentryandthe
large number of issuers limit issuers ability to
price noncompetitivelythat is, above cost. In
fact, in the ABAsurvey, all but the largest issuers
cited competition as the leading factor in setting
the interest rate on standard/classic cards.
But despite the ease of entry and large number
of firms, the industry displays some noncompet-
itive features. Earnings from credit card lending
have tended to be high relative to earnings from
other types of bank lending, according to a U.S.
GeneralAccountingOfficereport.Thissuggests
that new entry has not, for some reason, dissi-
pated profits, as would be expected. Comple-
menting the earnings evidence is a study by
Shaffer, which shows the presence of market
powerfortheindustryasawhole.Marketpower
exists when a firm can set the effective price of
itscardabovethecostofprovidinganadditional
card(whichincludesanallowanceforproviding
the owners of the firm a reasonable return on
their investment). Notably, Shaffer finds market
powertobeconcentratedamongafewcardissu-
ers, while the majority appeared to set price at
the cost of providing additional card accounts.
An issuers market power depends on con-
sumers sensitivity to the effective price. This
sensitivity, in turn, reflects how strongly con-
sumers perceive one card to be a substitute for
another. Some economists have found evidence
thatconsumersasawholearerelativelyinsensitive
to at least one component of a cards pricethe
APR. They have attributed this insensitivity to
costs of searching for and switching to a new
card that make cards poor substitutes for one
another(Ausubel;Calem;CalemandMester).If
consumers perceive such costs to be high, they
might not expect to find a card offering an effec-
tive price that justifies searching or switching.
As a result, at least some issuers could have
greater freedom to price above cost without los-
ing customers.
Another explanation for the limited card
substitutability and thus market power that
appears to exist is product differentiation. An
issuer can differentiate its card product from
thoseofitscompetitorsbyincorporatingdistinct
features into the card. Product differentiation
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tures or card usage differ across consumers. For
example, the many cards that donate a proportion
ofpurchasestononprofitorganizationsareexam-
ples of these efforts. So is the card that bears
Elvis likeness. Consumers might be willing to





from its competitors, it still might want to engage
in product differentiation to segment the market
for its own cards. With market segmentation, an
issueroffersalineofcardproducts,eachgearedto
a distinct part of the market and bearing a different
mix of price or nonprice features. Because each
productismorecloselytailoredtothedemandsof
a distinct customer group, the issuer can better
exploit its market power and improve profitabil-
ity than it could without market segmentation.
Of bank card issuers included in the ABA study,
18.5 percent segment their market based on the
revenue potential or risk level of card accounts.
The availability of gold and platinum cards in
addition to the basic standard/classic card is evi-
dence of this. Many issuers also vary rates, fees,
and other account terms, such as the grace period,
acrossdifferentcardtypesandthusdifferentmar-
ket segments.
At least two major market segments with dis-
tinct risk and revenue profiles can be identified
within the credit card industry. One is the market
forrevolvingcredit;theother,themarketforcon-
venience card use. Demand in the market for
revolving credit comes from revolverscon-
sumers who routinely revolve their balances.
Revolvers can differ from one another in their
creditrisktoissuersbutonaveragearemorerisky
than customers who always repay their balances
in full. The credit demand of revolvers is rela-
tively sensitive to the APR because they typically
incur finance charges that are a large share of
theirtotalcostofcarduse(Stavins).Infact,issu-
ers revenue from serving revolvers comes pri-
marily from those finance charges. By far the
largest expense associated with supplying revolv-
ersis the cost of loanable funds. The next largest
expense is losses from bad debt and fraud.
Theconvenience-usemarketsegmentconsists
oftwotypesofcardholders:thosewhogenerally
do not revolve a balance and thus are relatively
insensitive to the APR charged, and those who
always pay their bills in full and are completely
insensitive to the APR. Most likely, the majority
are of the first type, revolving an outstanding
balanceonlyiftheyaccidentallymissapayment
deadline, make an unusually large purchase that
they prefer to pay for over time, or suffer a tem-
porary shortfall in income. For analytical pur-
poses, then, they can be thought of as revolvers,
and the second type, the pure-convenience user,
can be thought of as constituting the conve-
nience-use market segment. Pure-convenience
usersgeneraterevenueforcardissuersprimarily
through interchange fees.
Why market power and market
segmentation matter
The two features of the credit card industry just
describedmarket power and market segmenta-
tionhave implications for the effectiveness of
pricingrestrictions.Marketpowermattersbecause
it allows issuers to raise price above cost. Its
presence thus creates the possibility that a pricing
restriction can be set to reduce the gap between
price and cost, which could potentially benefit con-
sumers. Market segmentation matters because
attempts to restrict card pricing have fallen into
two categoriescaps on interest rates for credit
card loans, and caps on fees and penalties for
convenience-only use. APR caps directly affect
the revolving-loan segment, whereas fees for con-
venience use affect only the convenience-use
segment.
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andconvenienceusersandthefactthatlegislative
initiatives have targeted the groups differently,
pricingrestrictionsoncardissuersareanalyzedin
two parts. Section IV examines the effects of
pricing restrictions on the revolving-loan market
segment, while section V does so for the conve-
nience-use segment.
IV.THE EFFECTS OF PRICING
RESTRICTIONS TO BENEFIT
REVOLVING BORROWERS
The implications of a pricing restriction in gen-
eral depend on two factors: the presence of mar-
ket power, as already discussed, and the extent to
which issuers can adjust the unrestricted compo-
nents of effective price in an effort to circumvent
the restriction. Because of the latter, the imposi-
tion of a cap on one component of effective price
lowers the level of that component, but might not
lower the effective price to consumers. The rea-
son is that issuers who were pricing to maximize
profit before the imposition of a pricing restric-
tion generally will have lower profits under the
restriction. Odds are they will need to adjust one
or more of the unrestricted effective-price com-
ponents to continue maximizing profit while
operating under a price cap. Again, using the
espresso bar analogy, a retailer facing a price cap
on coffee could discontinue the frequent-buyer
deal, buy lower quality beans, reduce the amount
of coffee per cup, and so forth. Cardholders, like
coffee drinkers, likely would be willing to accept
some adjustment of the unrestricted effec-
tive-price components because they benefit from
the lower level of the restricted component. This
holds even for card issuers who lack market
power. Consequently, after a pricing restriction is
imposed,issuersarelikelytosetthevariouscom-
ponents of effective price in a way that limits the
restrictions impact.
The remainder of this section addresses the
implications of an APR cap for consumers. The
results hinge on whether issuers can adjust the
unrestrictedcomponentsofeffectivepricetocir-
cumvent the cap and on the degree of market
power. They are summarized in Table 3.
When issuers can circumvent the
restriction
When issuers adjust the unrestricted compo-
nents of effective price to circumvent an APR
cap, from the perspective of issuers the effective
price remains unchanged. The same is not true
for consumers; in general, some of them are
worse off from the cap. Because the welfare
implicationsforparticularconsumersdependon
the exact adjustments made, the easiest way to
seethisresultisbyconsideringsomeexamples.
One possibility is that issuers respond to an
APR cap by increasing the annual fee a small
amounttoallcustomers,bothrevolversandcon-
venienceusersalike.Convenienceusersaredef-
initely worse off in this case because they pay a
higher annual fee but enjoy none of the benefits
of a lower APR. Revolvers who carry larger bal-
ances are more likely to be better off due to the
restriction than those who borrow less. The rea-
son is that heavier borrowers generally will be
morewillingtopayasteeperfeeforaccesstothe
now cheaper line of credit. Revolvers as a group
will benefit only if the cost to them of the addi-
tionalannualfeeismorethanoffsetbythebene-
fit from the lower APR.
An example with broader repercussions
involves an increase in interchange-fee rates to
offset the costs of the APR cap. Higher inter-
change fees increase merchants cost of selling
to customers on credit. To the extent possible,
merchants will pass the higher cost on to con-
sumers through higher product prices. In this
case, even non-cardholders will be worse off
because of the restriction.
These three examples illustrate that consum-
ers in general cannot be said to benefit when
issuers can adjust the non-APR components of
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some consumers might benefit, others are likely
to be harmed by the resulting mix of effec-
tive-price components.
When issuers cannot circumvent the
restriction
The second possible outcome arises when issu-
ers cannot adjust the non-APR components of
effective price to circumvent the rate cap. In this
case, the rate cap lowers the effective price to
consumers, who want to borrow more revolving
credit as a result. Whether they succeed at doing
so and whether they benefit depends on issuers
marketpower.Ingeneral,consumersdonotbene-
fit from the pricing restriction.
When issuers lack market power. Issuers with-
out market power are already pricing competi-
tively(makingallloansforwhichtherevenueper
dollar lent is sufficient to cover the extra cost of
making the loan). For such issuers, an APR cap is
necessarilybelowthecostofprovidingadditional
credit, so customer demand for credit cards is too
great from the issuers perspective. The increase
in the volume of credit demanded drives up the
cost of providing the additional loans since issu-
ers must pay higher interest rates to attract addi-
tional loanable funds and higher input prices to
attract more labor, equipment, etc. But the extra
revenue from making those additional loans is
less than the extra cost. In the absence of adjust-
mentsintheothercomponentsofeffectiveprice,
issuers prefer to ration credit than to make such
costly loans. Rationing can be accomplished by
issuers raising credit standards and denying
credit to higher-risk borrowers. Consumers who
continue to get the credit they demand benefit
because they pay a lower effective price for it,
while those denied credit necessarily are
harmed. Or, issuers can instead ration credit by
continuing to serve all existing customers but
imposing tighter credit limits or increasing the
required minimum monthly payment. In the
most extreme case, where the rate cap is so low
that issuers cannot break even serving the mar-
ket segment, complete rationing occurs. The
market for card credit shuts down, and all con-
sumers are harmed.
The bottom line is that when issuers do not
have market power, the benefit to consumers
from getting credit at a lower APR may not
exceed the cost of reduced availability. Thus,
consumerscannot be saidtobenefitfromanAPR
cap. And depending on the extent to which
rationing occurs, they may all be hurt.
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Table 3
ARE PRICING RESTRICTIONS LIKELY TO BENEFIT
CONSUMERS AS A WHOLE?
If issuers adjust other components of the effective price to
circumvent the restriction No
If issuers do not adjust other components of the effective
price to circumvent the restriction
And issuers do not have market power No
And issuers have market power
And the cap is sufficiently low No
And the cap is sufficiently high YesWhen issuers have market power. When issuers
have market power, there are two possible out-
comes,dependingonhowlowtheAPRcapisset.
In the first case, where the cap is sufficiently low,
the result is exactly the same as when issuers lack
market power: issuers ration credit and possibly
cease operation altogether.
In the second case, where issuers have market
power and the APR cap is sufficiently high, the
result is more promising. Issuers with market
power mark up price above the cost of additional
lending, creating a range within which an APR
cap can fall without inducing rationing. If the cap
is set in that range, consumers are willing to borrow
more because the APR cap is lower than the cur-
rent price. And assuming they can earn an ade-
quate rate of return under the cap, issuers are
willing to make the additional loans because the
cap is at least as high as the extra cost of making
them. Customers benefit as a result. They all con-
tinue to obtain credit, and they obtain it at a lower
effective price.
Implications for consumers. These findings
suggest that only one situation exists in which an
APR cap unambiguously benefits consumers as a
whole. That situation involves all issuers having
market power, the APR cap being so high that its
imposition does not induce credit rationing, and
issuers being unable to circumvent the cap by
adjusting the non-APR components of effective
price. Only then would credit be provided to at
least as many customers as without the APR cap,
and at a lower effective price, moving the indus-
try closer to the efficient ideal.
But this situation is not observed in todays
credit card industry. The evidence presented in
section III suggests that most issuers have little if
any market power and considerable ability to
offset the impact of a rate cap by altering the
non-APR components of effective price. And the
rate-capmeasuresoftenproposedhavebeenquite
restrictive. If passed into law, they would have
given the average issuer little choice but to shut
down. Consequently, such pricing restrictions
cannot be said to benefit consumers as a whole.
While some consumers might benefit, others
will be harmed.
V. THE EFFECTS OF PRICING
RESTRICTIONS TO BENEFIT
CONVENIENCE USERS
Obviously, APR caps do not aim to benefit con-
sumers in the convenience-use market segment.
But recent legislative efforts have sought to pro-
tect the convenience user by prohibiting (capping
at $0) GE feesfees for pure-convenience use.
Issuers, though, claim that such fees are necessary
because of increases in the cost of supplying the
market segment. Though cardholders might not
tolerate an interest fee applied to the dollar vol-
umeoftransactions,theymightbewillingtopay
a modest fixed fee to guarantee access to a con-
venient means of payment and a line of short-
term credit for emergencies. Issuers of course
must set such a fixed fee cautiously because the
number of customers demanding convenience
use might decrease noticeably from the fee.
The rest of this section analyzes the impact of a
fee cap, taking as the motivation for a GE fee the
desire to cover increased costs. Market power
should be negligible in the convenience-use
market because consumers can always use cash
or checks in lieu of credit cards. This leaves the
effect of a fee cap dependent primarily on the
extent to which the cap can be circumvented
through adjustments to the unrestricted compo-
nents of effective price. The results are summa-
rized in Table 3.
When issuers can circumvent the
restriction
Afeecapneednotbebeneficialorevenneu-
tralin its impact on consumers when issuers
can adjust the unrestricted price and nonprice
card features that make up the effective price. It
is very likely that issuers will want higher inter-
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since issuers major source of revenue from conve-
nience users is interchange fees. As already dis-
cussed, this can result in higher prices to all
consumers.
Similarly, issuers could react to a fee cap by
increasing other fees, such as annual fees and late
payment fees. These fee increases would have to
apply to all customers because the cap prohibits
fee adjustments applied only to convenience
users. If the fees are increased, then some of the
cost of supplying convenience users is passed on
to revolvers. Convenience users, however, might
notbewillingtopayhigherannualandotherfees;
they might, instead, prefer to switch to alternative
means of payment.
This analysis suggests that issuers have an
incentive to expand and better differentiate their
product lines in the hope of increasing their mar-
ket power and thus their ability to charge higher
fees. Customers can be offered upgrades to new
card products that provide a wider range of free
servicesinexchangeforahigherannualfee.Such
efforts at product differentiation are likely to be
observedinbothmarketsegments.Butsinceissu-
ers have relatively more market power in the
revolving-loan market than in the conve-
nience-use market, these efforts are qualitatively
less important for the analysis of APR caps.
The conclusion is that when issuers can adjust
the unrestricted components of effective price, a
prohibition of a GE fee generally perpetuates or
induces a transfer of wealth from those who are
not pure-convenience users to those who are.
Whetherthiswealthtransferisdesirableisapolit-
ical question, not an economic question.
When issuers cannot circumvent the
restriction
When issuers cannot make sufficient adjust-
ments in the unrestricted card terms, the effective
price to convenience users under the fee cap is
below what it would be with a GE fee. More
consumers demand cards for convenience use at
the lower effective price. If issuers motivation
for imposing the fee was to cover the increased
cost of supplying convenience users, the
demand for cards for convenience use is higher
thantheydesire.Andasbefore,issuersarelikely
to engage in credit rationing by supplying fewer
conveniencecardsbyreducingoreveneliminat-
ing the grace period on outstanding cards. This
makes convenience users more profitable by
turning them into revolvers. Card cancellation is
anotherlikelyrationingmethod.Customerswho
charge a low dollar volume of purchases and
thus who generate little interchange-fee revenue
are the most likely to experience this practice. In
the extreme case, issuers cease operation
because they cannot earn an adequate return
supplying the market segment. Either approach
drives some convenience users to switch to
using cash or checks for a larger share of their
purchases. If convenience users were making
their most preferred mix of cash, check, conve-
nience credit card, and revolving credit pur-
chases before the GE cap was imposed, which is




on GE fees is likely to hurt, rather than benefit,
consumers. At a minimum, convenience users
are worse off because of adjustments to price
terms and product features or because of credit
rationing. And all consumers can be harmed if
interchange rates are raised and passed on in
higher product prices.
VI.THE 1980 EXPERIENCE
The United States has one recent experience
with binding interest rate ceilings on credit card
accounts. This case vividly illustrates that pric-
ing restrictions can indeed lead to rationing and
toadjustmentsintheunrestrictedcomponentsof
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have that experience to thank for the annual fees
they pay today.
As discussed in section I, in early 1980 market
interest rates soared, bumping against state usury
ceilings that capped interest rates on consumer
credit. This subjected most card issuers to a binding
limit on their APR. As a result, their cost of funds
exceeded what they could earn on credit card
loans, making card lending a losing proposition.
At the first opportunity, card issuers changed
card fees and account terms. Acongressional sur-
vey of 59 card issuers offering 96 distinct charge
cards found that the most common response was
for issuers to impose an annual fee on their cards.
Annual fees were imposed on 49 percent of the
cardssurveyed.Issuersalsorationedcreditbynot
accepting new card applications on 42 percent of
cards and by raising credit standards on 41 per-
cent of cards.
Issuers sought to offset the interest rate ceiling
more directly by changing the terms of accounts
to increase the amount of interest owed on out-
standing balances. On 41 percent of cards, the
finance charge was calculated differently. On 35
percent of cards, the APR was increased; those
increases occurred when and where feasible. And
on 23 percent of cards, the minimum monthly pay-
ment was raised. For example, Exxon announced
that it would include in the minimum monthly
paymentallsinglepurchasesunder$40.Sincethe
cost of the typical tank of gas was well under $40
in 1980, this change would force most cardholders
to pay their bills in full each month. Issuers
applied these changes retroactively to outstand-
ing balances on 86 percent of cards, although
federal law required that customers be allowed to
paytheiroutstandingbalancesbeforethechanges
took effect. The 1980 experience thus confirms
the prediction that issuers, when faced with
restrictionsononecomponentofeffectiveprice,
will adjust other components and possibly
ration, reducing the likelihood that the restric-
tion will be beneficial.
VII. DO CONSUMERS BENEFIT
FROM CREDIT CARD REFORM
MEASURES?
Many efforts at credit card reform have aimed
to benefit consumers by restricting issuerspric-
ing practices. But as this article has shown, it is
not at all clear that such efforts can achieve their
objective. Consumers as a whole are unambigu-
ously better off only under very unusual circum-
stancescircumstances that do not prevail in
todays card industry. More likely, pricing restric-
tions at best have no effect because issuers get
aroundthembymakingadjustmentsintheunre-
stricted effective-price components. At worst,
suchrestrictionslowertheeffectivepricetocon-
sumers, but credit rationing occurs, keeping at
least some consumers from getting the credit
they want. Such an outcome is likelyand was
observed in the United States in 1980, when
binding restrictions on card interest rates were
experienced.
These findings have relevance for pricing
restrictions on any good or service, not just credit
cards.Withinthebankingindustry,forexample,
they apply to proposals to prohibit surcharges
for automated-teller-machine (ATM) transactions.
And in the telecommunications industry, they
pertain to restrictions now under consideration
on the ability of telephone companies to charge
minimum monthly fees for long-distance service.
The lesson of this article is clear: pricing restric-
tionsarenotingeneralbeneficialforconsumers.
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